This paper derives an expected utility theorem from the principle of self-preservation thus providing a new interpretation of the notion of rationality underlying the voi~ NeumannMorgenstern theory. Self-preservation is defined as the maximiTation of the probability of survival in a finite horizon model where in each period the decision maker must choose a risky prospect from a feasible set of such prospects and becomes extinct if his accumulated fortune becomes non-positive. It is shown that the choice of the optimal strategy may be regarded as an expected utility maximizing behavior and that violations of the independence axiom, e.g., Allais paradox, imply that decision-makers choose a probability of survival smaller than the maximum possible given the set of acts. Furthermore, according to this approach rational attitudes toward risk are also derived from the model. 'There is, of course, an important sense in which preferences being entirely subjective cannot be in error; but in a different more subtle sense they can be.' L.J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics
Introduction
The idea of using expected utility to evaluate courses of action with uncertain outcomes was first suggested by Daniel Bernoulli (1738) , as a way resolving the St. Petersburg paradox. Not until the publication in 1947 of von Neumann and Morgenstern's second edition of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, however, was this idea given an axiomatic foundation which rendered it rational. Rationality, according to this approach, defines structures of individual preferences among alternative courses of action or acts the exact consequences of which are not known at the time the decision is to be made. In the yon Neumann-Morgenstern theory, acts assume the simple form of lotteries with known probability distributions over a set of prizes; the notion of rational preferences is captured by the axioms of weak order, continuity, and independence. These axioms are tantamount to representation of the preference relation on the set of lotteries by the mathematical expectation of a utility function on the set of prizes. The independence axiom has been justified by a common sense reasoning which attempts to appeal to our intuition. Nevertheless, numerous observers who subjected the independence axiom to direct tests, report finding systematic violations of the choice pattern predicted by it. The best known of these is Allais ' (1953) puzzle.
The fact that most of the reported evidence is based upon hypothetical rather than actual choices raises the question of whether the same mental process that accounts for actual decisions is that which shows up in the experimental evidence. However, if one takes the attitude that these are essentially the same processes then the conclusion that the behavioral implications of the independence axiom are not supported by the evidence is unavoidable. In these circumstances one may still advocate the independence axiom on normative grounds [see the discussion in Savage (1954, pp. 18-21) 1 as a desirable mode of behavior. The normative justification, however, must rest upon the claim that the decision-maker fares better if he chooses his acts in agreement with the rules implied by the axioms than if he chooses them in violation of these rules and not on the aesthetic appeal of the axioms. Thus a given set of axioms is regarded as rational when applied to the solution of decision problems in the sense that the rule 'two plus two equals four' is regarded as correct (rational) when applied to the solution of en~neering problems. This approach requires a criterion which defines rationality in terms of the relative advantages of alternative decision-strategies, and which replaces the axioms as the primitive element of the theory. A test of the rationality of the independence axiom, according to this approach, is whether when facing choices such as those in Allais' puzzle choosing patterns of response consistent with the prediction of the independence axiom is superior according to the given criterion, to patterns which are not consistent with that axiom.
We propose that the fundamental principle which should serve as a criterion for defining rational behavior is the principle of self-preservation. Generally speaking the principle of self-preservation postulates that individuals make decisions so as to maximize the probability of their survival, and that they rank decision strategies according to this criterion alone. This is not to say that once the principle is recognized the best course of action in any given choice situation becomes self-evident. Mistakes, indeed even systematic mistakes, cannot be ruled out. The principle laid down here does imply, however, that agents that commit serious errors are more likely to become extinct.
The following example serves to illustrate the argument. Consider an individual who may live up to two periods, i.e., the individual is extinct at the end of the second period if he was not extinct before. Suppose further that the individual becomes extinct at the beginning of period t (t = 1, 2) ff his fortune at that time is non-positive.
Denote by X= {xx,...,xN} a finite set of prizes and let l be a probability x> --w 0 x> --w 0 Thus, the objective of self-preservation defines a preference relation on Lt.
Letting u(x) = V(wo + x Ig*(wo + x)) for x > -We and u(x) = 0 otherwise, u(x) is avon Neumann-Morgenstern utility. The principle of self preservation implies that preferences over L1 satisfy the expected utility hypothesis which, in turn, implies the three von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms (on L1). Decisions that are inconsistent with the independence axiom are inconsistent with the maximivation of survival probabilities.
The notion that the rule of maximization of expected utility implies some other proposition which is more convincing than the rule itself was expressed by Marschak (1951) . The specific proposition that Marschak had in mind is the rule of long run success. According to this rule a best strategy (for selecting acts) is defined as the strategy whose probability of resulting in the most preferred sequence of prizes tends to one as the length of the sequence tends to infinity. Marschak did not show under what conditions the rule of long-run success is implied by the expected utility maximizing behavior. Camacho (1979) presented a set of restrictions on the preference relation over the set of sequences which yields the result that expected utility maximizing behavior yields Marschak's rule. Apart from being quite restrictive, Camacho's result and Marschak's position do not insist on deriving the expected utility maximizing behavior from the rule of long run success. They only demand that the maximization of expected utility is not inconsistent with this rule.
The approach presented in the present paper differs from that of Marschak in two important respects. First, according to our approach the expected utility maximizing behavior is an implication of the principle of selfpreservation. We regard this principle and not the expected utility model as the primitive notion of the theory. Second, Marschak's rule of long-run success and the principle of self-preservation are quite different notions. Marschak's rule assigns to each strategy a random variable, namely the utility of the sequence generated by that strategy, whereas the selfpreservation principle assigns each strategy a non-random number representing the probability of survival under that strategy. Consequently, in comparing two strategies according to Marschak's rule one looks at the probability that the difference in the utility under the two strategies is positive while according to the self-preservation principle one has to look at the difference between the probabilities of survival under the two strategies. These induce quite different preference relations on the set of strategies.
Borch (1966) studied a game of economic survival due to Shubik and Thompson (1959) , and interprets the solution in terms of a yon NeumannMorgenstern utility. The game consists of repeated Bernoulli trials with a probability of success larger than 1/2 where the firm gains or loses one dollar in each trial. Starting with an initial capital of S dollars, the firm stays in the game as long as S>0. The firm pays dividends with the objective of maximizing the expected discounted value of the dividends. The optimal dividend policy is to let the capital accumulate up to an amount Z and then pay out the excess as dividend immediately. Borch shows that the expectation of the discounted future stream of dividends may be interpreted as the utility of the initial capital so that choices among current risky prospects obey the expected utility theorem.
Borch's analysis is similar to ours in its emphasis upon the dynamic aspect of the decision problem, namely that the utility of present decisions depend on the prospects that the decision-maker will face in the future. The main difference between our approach and that of Botch is the specification decision-maker's objective, which in our case is the maximization of the probability of survival rather than the expected discounted profit. Consequently, our utility function has the interpretation of survival probability whereas in Borch's analysis it has the interpretation of expected discounted dividends.
Our concept of strategy and the assumption of strategy (path) independence to be discussed below is a special case of the concept of strategy employed by Dubins and Savage (1965) . However, the objective of survival to the end of the last period, which is the essence of our approach, is not included in the optimality criteria of Dubins and Savage. In the analysis of Dubins and Savage the gambler's objective is expressed in terms of a 'final' fortune, and there is no limitation on the number of time periods that he can participate in the game.
A more general model and its relation to expected utility maximizing behavior is explored in the next section. Concluding remarks and further discussion appear in section 3.
Self-preservation and expected utility maximizing behavior
Consider an individual who may survive up to T periods, i.e., the individual is extinct (ruined) at the end of period T if he was not extinct before, where T is a finite integer greater than one. The individual is ruined at the beginning of period t, t < T if his fortune w, at that time falls short of some critical level. More precisely it is assumed, with no loss of generality, that if wt < 0 for some t then the individual is extinct.
Let Xt, t = 1,..., T be finite sets of numbers and let Lt, t--1,..., T, be sets of lotteries (acts) with prizes in X r At the start of each period, t, t = 1,..., T the individual must choose an act from L t which results in a prize x, e X,. This prize is added to his fortune wt-1 to determine his fortune wt for the period. Let Wo =X0 be a set of positive numbers and suppose that Wo, the initial fortune is an element of Wo.
Let Xt=XoxXxx ... xXt-1, t=l,2,...,T, T+I, denote the set of histories of prizes up to and including period t-1. Let Xt+ ={xteX t] for j = 1, 2,..., t-1 ~=o xl > 0} for t = 1, 2,..., T, T+ 1. Thus Xt+ is the subset of histories of prizes up to period t (exclusive) such that the fortune of the individual does not fall short of the critical level required for his survival.
t--1
For t= 1,2,..., T let W,= {w,=E,=oXil(Xo, Let Sr={st:X'+~Lt} for t=l,2,...,T, and St=StxSt+tx'"XST, t= 1,2,..., T. A strategy s is an element of S ~. Given a strategy s, we denote its tail by steS t. Finally, given w 0 and geL~ (s wo, g) means that sl(wo)=geLt. The probability of survival to the end of period T if strategy s is employed and the initial fortune is Wo, V(s Wo), is the (finite) sum of the probabilities Pr(yr+~ls ) over all yr+l in X TM, where yo=wo and Pr(yr+~[s)=
HT=I st(yt-t)(yt) , st(yt-1)~Lr

Given woeWo a strategy ~eS ~ is a best strategy in S ~ if and only ff V(g Wo)>V(s Wo) for all s eSL Similarly, given woeWo, (~]Wo, g) is a best conditional (continuation) strategy in S ~ if and only if V((~]wo, g) Wo)>= V((s wo, g)]wo) for all s~S ~ such that s~(Wo)=geL. We shall use the notation V(s]wo, g) for V((s]wo, g) Wo). Claim 1. If Lt is closed for t= 1,..., T, then for each Woe Wo there exists a best strategy ~eS 1. Furthermore, ~ can be so defined that for all t and all x' e Xt+ : V(~lx' ) >= V(St x') for all s t e S'.
Let I_J=Zt×Lt+ 1 × "'" xLr, for t=l,...,Z Then Claim 1 is an immediate consequence of the continuity of the function V(slwo) in s and the compactness of S which follows from the compactness of L x.
Claim 2. There is a best strategy as in Claim 1 such that for all t, 1 < t< T, • t-1 t-1
and for all x' and yt in Xt+: /f E,__oy,=E,=oX,, then gt(x') =g,(yt).
The following simple example shows that not every best strategy satisfies the conclusion of Claim 2. Suppose that T= 4 and for all t, Lt = { f = a flip of a fair coin, g = a roll of a fair die}. More specifically, f(x) = 1/2 for x = -1,1 and g(x)= 1/6 for x =0,1,..., 5. Suppose that wo =xo = 1. Obviously, gl(xo)=g, but g2(1,5) can be either g or f and the same is true for g3(1,5,') and g4(1,5,-,'). For instance we can have g4(1,5,4,3)=f and g4(1, 5, 5, 4) =g which contradicts the conclusion of Claim 2.
We prove Claim 2 by backward induction. Suppose it holds for z > t and
_~t-1 X _~'t-I , consider the case where xt, yt~Xt+, w,-/_,i=o i-/_,i=oyi and gt(xt)~g,(yt).
Define a new strategy g which coincides with g everywhere except in one place: gt(yt)=gt(xt)=gt(x'), ff V(glWo)~ v(glWo) for some woe W0 then we get a contradiction to the definition of g in Claim 1. Rename g as g. After finitely many changes of this kind we get ge S x satisfying the condition of Claim 2. The intuitive explanation of this result is that survival in this model depends upon the cumulative fortune of the individual and not on the exact history which generated it.
Let S={s~S ~ for all t and all xt, y t in xt+:Et, z~x,=E~zly,=~s~x~= st(yt)}. A generalization of Claim 2 is:
Claim 3. For all s~S ~ there is g~S so that for all t and all xt, ytEXt: (i) V(~lx')>=v(Ylx'), and
(ii)
x,}.
Condition (ii) of Claim 3 indicates that the construction of g from s is similar to that of ~ from g in the proof of Claim 2. However, in order to guarantee (i) the construction is consecutive starting from t= T and ending with t = 1.
Henceforth we restrict our attention to strategies in S and, without loss of generality, we consider S=S1 x "--x S r where for all t St= {st: Wt~Lt}. Thus, our concept of strategy is in line with (and a special case of) that of Dubins
and Savage (1965).
We use the probability of survival to define a preference relation over L1. Let Wo=Xo represent the current fortune (accumulated wealth) of the individual. The sets of acts L2,La,...,LT represent the future opportunities that are taken into account in evaluating acts in L1. Let (g[wo, g) 
~x~ f(x)u(x)> ~'~xtg(x)u(x).
Hence, we observe that preferences over L t induced by the criterion of selfpreservation satisfy the expected utility hypothesis which in turn implies the independence axiom. It is in this sense that the latter axiom in conjunction with the axioms of weak order and continuity is regarded as a principle of rational behavior.
Next we show that even if the closure assumption (needed only for L2, Ls,..., Lr) is not satisfied we can still carry on our construction.
Definition. Given a woeWo and f, geL~ we write f~g if and only if there is an e>0 such that for each s eS ~ there is an r eS t so that
V(r[wo,f)> V(s]wo, g)+~.
We refer to the preference relation >-on L t as induced by the selfpreservation criterion. The set S t in the definition can be changed to ,g of Claim 3. 
., T and S t. Then given Woe Wo and all f, geLl : f>-g according to the Definition if and only if V(g[wo, f)> V(g[wo, g ).
Proof. Suppose that for some f and g in L t there is an 5> 0 such that, by the Definition, for all s e S t there is an r in S 1 so that
Consider a sequence of strategies (s,),%t in S 1 converging to g in the closure of S 1 and the corresponding sequence (.),=t r oo in S t . For all n,
V(g[wo,f)> V(s,[wo, g)+e. By continuity of V onthe closure of S t we get in the limit V(g[wo, f)>= V(g[wo, g)+e> V(g]wo, g).
To prove the converse suppose that V(g [wo, f)> V(g[wo, g) . 
V(rlwo, f) > v( lwo, g) + >= V(s[wo, g) + for all s ~ S ~
This proof shows that in the Definition (of >-) we can change the order of the quantifiers and make r independent of s. Claim 4 and the previous discussion imply
Theorem. Suppose that L ~, w o ~ Wo and a preference relation ~ on L1 induced by the self-preservation criterion are given. Then there is a real valued function u on X1 such that for all f and g in L1
.
Furthermore, if the closure of L1 consists of all lotteries over Xl then u is unique up to a positive linear transformation.
The expected utility theory of decision-making under uncertainty does not restrict the decision-maker's attitudes toward risk. The notion of rational behavior according to this theory does not extend past the requirement that the preference functional be linear in the probabilities. Qualifications of attitudes toward risk are introduced as additional hypotheses such as Arrow's (1965) theory of risk aversion or the Friedman and Savage (1948) utility function. In this respect the expected utility hypothesis is based on the perception that attitudes toward risk, being entirely subjective, cannot be in error. A perception which is also shared by Machina's (1982) generalization of the expected utility analysis to nonlinear preference functionals, and by Debreu's (1959, ch. 7) state-preference approach to decision-making under uncertainty.
A priori there is no compelling reason to restrict the implications of rational behavior in this manner. Attitudes toward risk may be erroneous in the same sense that preferences over acts may be in error if they are not representable by a linear preference functional. According to our approach attitudes toward risk are correct, or rational, if and only if they are consistent with the principle of serf-preservation. To illustrate how specific attitudes toward risks in the first period can be derived from special restrictions on the lotteries available in the second period consider a twoperiod model and suppose that the set or prizes consists of the real numbers. As customary in the literature on risk aversion, we define utility on wealth rather than on prizes, i.e., in our notation u(w0 instead of u(x). This utility is derived from the lotteries available in period 2. Suppose that L2 consists of two normal distributions: GI-,~N(0,1) and G2~N(ft, o'2) , where #>0 and ~> 1. Our previous discussion implies that if the decision-maker enters period 2 with wealth wl, then he will choose the lottery which minimiTes Gi(-wl) over i=1,2. This strategy maximizes the probability of survival until the end of the second period. Let G*(-wx) be the minimum of {Gl(-Wl),G2(-wl)} for wl>0 and G*(-wl)=l for wl__<0. Clearly G* is a cumulative distribution function. It is illustrated in fig. 1 . The corresponding utility function, u(wl)= 1-G*(-wx) is depicted in fig. 2 . 
W
In this example u is locally risk averse almost everywhere, yet it is not globally risk averse. To describe fully the behavioral implications of u we introduce a concept of risk aversion at w. A decision-maker is said to display risk aversion at w if he does not prefer any actuarially fair bet around w over receiving w with certainty. If u is almost everywhere locally concave its concavification u* differs from u at a union of open intervals. At each point w where u*(w)=u(w) the decision-maker displays risk aversion at w. At the points where u*(w)>u(w) the decision-maker will accept some fair bet while rejecting others. This is a property which has been studied in Friedman and Savage (1948) .
Concluding remarks
According to the model presented in section 2, the sets of lotteries L1,...,Lr are fixed. It may be argued, however, that one sense in which the acquisition of wealth improves the chances of survival is that it affords its owners superior opportunities, or acts, to choose from. This idea may be incorporated into our framework by assuming that L t, the tail of the list of sets of acts, depends on the individual fortune at the outset of period t. This modification does not alter any essential aspects of the model or the conclusions of the theorem.
If, however, the strategy or specifically the selection of a lottery in the first period affects the sets of lotteries available in subsequent periods in a way other than through its effect on the decision-maker's fortune, then the utility may not be linear in probabilities. The assumption that the sets of available lotteries do not depend directly on strategies is referred to as strategy (or path) independence and is crucial for our results.
In this paper we have stated and illustrated some implications of a principle of self-preservations. At the risk of sounding simplistic we have presented the principle within the simplest model. This model, however, need not be taken literally and it is capable of accommodating more than one interpretation. For instance, the multidimensionality of economic behavior can be incorporated by letting wt be an n-dimensional vector and supposing that survival depends on wt belonging to a prespecified subset of the ndimensional space. The main result will follow without any essential alteration in other aspects of the model.
A different sticking point has to do with the justification for maximiTing the probability of survival to period T as the sole criterion for rational behavior. One way of justifying our approach is to consider this as a model of behavior in situations where a certain prerequisite needs to be satisfied before other action can be taken -such as passing a series of tests before being allowed to participate in a game. In the theory of evolution a possible justification for maximizing the probability of survival to period T is that reproduction takes place at that time. In this interpretation our criterion is closely related to the idea of the survival of the gene. Having said that we do recognize that the model presented here, far from being the ultimate word on this subject, is a modest step toward developing a new approach to the theory of decision-making under uncertainty. As it stands it can serve as a model of decision-making under uncertainty in situations where 'survival first' is a reasonable characterization of the decision problem.
